A new, general theory argues it is not about costly or exaggerated show-offs but about the inherent trade-offs between investments and benefits animals (and humans) face when they signal. The work offers a clearer way to understand peacocks, people, and persuasion by accounting both for honest as well as deceptive signals.
For decades, scientists have tried to answer a simple question: why be honest when deception is possible? Whether it is a peacock’s tail, a stag’s roar, or a human’s résumé, signals are means to influence others by transmitting information and advantages can be gained by cheating, for example by exaggeration. But if lying pays, why does communication not collapse?
The dominant theory for honest signals has long been the handicap principle, which claims that signals are honest because they are costly to produce. It argues that a peacock’s tail, for example, is an honest signal of a male’s condition or quality to potential mates because it is so costly to produce. Only a high-quality birds could afford such a handicap, wasting resources growing it, demonstrating their superb quality to females, whereas poor quality males cannot afford such ornaments.
A new synthesis by Szabolcs Számadó, Dustin J. Penn and István Zachar (from the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna and HUN-REN Centre for Ecological Research, respectively) challenges that logic. They argue that honesty does not depend on how costly or wasteful a signal is, but rather on the trade-offs between investments and benefits, faced by signalers.
They explain that signals are not honest because they are costly, instead, honesty evolves when it is beneficial and deception is costly. Previous studies inspired by the handicap principle (refuted by the authors in the paper) misleadingly focused on only the costs of signalling. Yet biological functions, like signalling, cannot be understood in the evolutionary context without their benefits, often realized in the long run.

The new theory, called Signalling Trade-Off Theory, shifts the focus from absolute cost to choice in what to invest. In biology, every organism faces competing demands: investing more in one thing means having less for another. Time spent courting cannot be spent feeding; energy put into bright feathers cannot be used for immune defence. These are trade-offs. And these are also present in economic choices for humans. Crucially, they differ between individuals. A healthy, well-fed animal can afford different choices than a weak or starving one. According to several theoretical studies, signalling trade-offs and not absolute costs define whether deception or honesty evolves.
“Signals, in theory, can be absolutely cost free in terms of immediate energy investment.” – István Zachar, one of the authors explains – “Honesty does not come from how much a signal harms you but from what kind of cost-benefit ratio you can realize with it.” And this trade-off between investments and benefits is defined by the condition of the individual.
According to theory, honest signals arise when these trade-offs respect the true quality of the individual, i.e. are condition-dependent. High-quality individuals get more return from the same investment than low-quality ones. As a result, the best strategy for a strong individual is to signal more, while the best strategy for a weak individual is to signal less. “Both are behaving optimally,” the author says, “but because their trade-offs are different, their signals end up revealing who they are.” This is how honesty is defined.
This perspective helps clear up a long-standing puzzle. An increasing number of studies show that honest signals are sometimes cheap, cost-free, or even beneficial, to produce. Under the handicap view, this was baffling, because honesty was supposed to require wasteful costs. Under the trade-off view, it is what one would expect. What matters is not whether a signal costs something in absolute terms, but whether pretending to be better than you are would push you into a worse overall outcome. Trade-offs apply to cheaters as well, and while they can increase their reproductive success by a fake message, this may severely affect their survival.
The trade-off theory also explains why deception is common. If different quality individuals face the same trade-offs, then nothing stops them from using the same signal. In those cases, mimics, bluffers, and cheats can thrive. “Dishonesty is absolutely not a failure of nature,” – Zachar notes. “It is what you get when the trade-offs that normally separate the different quality individuals disappear or become identical.”
This idea helps make sense of cases ranging from harmless butterflies mimicking poisonous ones to animals that increase their sexual displays when they are near death. In such “terminal investment,” there is little future to protect, so the usual balance between today and tomorrow is gone, and exaggerated signalling becomes worthwhile.
Why does this matter beyond biology? Because the same logic applies to human communication, from advertising to cooperation based on reputation. We all operate under trade-offs (inherited or learnt) between short-term gains and long-term consequences. Signals are reliable when those trade-offs differ across people in ways that make bluffing unprofitable.
“The real question is not ‘how costly is this signal?’” – Zachar says – “It is ‘what would it cost this person, in terms of what else they could have done, to fake it?’”
By reframing honesty in terms of trade-offs rather than waste, the new theory brings signalling back in line with a broader understanding of evolution: organisms are not rewarded for squandering resources, but for allocating them efficiently under constraints. In that light, honest communication is not a miracle. It is a natural outcome of living in a non-quantum biological world where every choice closes off another.
Reference:
A general signalling theory: why honest signals are explained by trade-offs rather than costs or handicaps
Szabolcs Számadó1,2, István Zachar3,4 & Dustin J. Penn5
Published in Journal of Evolutionary Biology
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeb/voaf144
1 Department of Sociology and Communication, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Egry J. u. 1. H‑1111 Budapest, Hungary
2 CSS-RECENS “Lendület” Research Group, HUN-REN Centre for Social Science, Tóth Kálmán u. 4., H‑1097 Budapest, Hungary
3 Institute of Evolution, HUN-REN Centre for Ecological Research, Konkoly-Thege Miklós út 29-33., H‑1121 Budapest, Hungary
4 Department of Plant Systematics, Ecology and Theoretical Biology, Eötvös Loránd University, Pázmány P. sétány 1/C, H-1117 Budapest, Hungary
5 Department of Interdisciplinary Life Sciences, Konrad Lorenz Institute of Ethology, University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna, Savoynestrasse 1a, 1160 Vienna, Austria


























